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TAYLOR V. RIOJAS: ANATOMY OF A 
SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION THAT 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY 
By Zamir Ben-Dan* 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2013, an inmate in a Texas prison allegedly spent six days in 
two uninhabitable cells.1 One cell was covered in “massive amounts of feces”; 
the other cell was freezing cold and lacked a sink, a bunk, and a toilet, 
containing only a clogged floor drain for him to relieve himself.2 The very 
thought that a human being would be caged under such appalling conditions 
should shock the conscious of any person who hears about it; and few 
laypersons would doubt that confining a person under these circumstances is 
plainly illegal. Yet, it took seven years and an unlikely Supreme Court 
intervention for an official pronouncement that, if indeed the inmate was 
incarcerated under such conditions for almost a full week, those responsible for 
his confinement violated clearly established constitutional law.3 
In between those seven years, two different federal courts—the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals—dismissed the inmate’s Eighth Amendment claims and 
granted qualified immunity to the officials responsible for the inmate’s 
confinement in the two disgusting cells.4 The flagrant violation of this inmate’s 
Eighth Amendment rights is obvious and totally outrageous; but the biggest 
disgrace is that the Fifth Circuit needed the Supreme Court to tell them that. 
Both lower courts placed heavy emphasis on one line from a 1978 Supreme 
Court decision, and relied on prior fifth circuit caselaw that also depended on 
the same line from the same Supreme Court decision.5 This note will review 
these decisions, concluding that both opinions display a blatant disregard for 
both the humanity of the inmate and basic common sense. 
 
*  Staff Attorney, Community Justice Unit of the Legal Aid Society; Adjunct Professor, 
CUNY School of Law; Adjunct Professor, Baruch College – Black and Latino Studies; 
B.B.A., Baruch College, J.D., CUNY Law. Acknowledgments to the staff of the Nevada 
Law Journal for editing and publishing this piece. 
1  Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2019). 
2  Id. at 218–19. 
3  See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020). 
4  See Taylor, 946 F.3d at 216–17. 
5  See id. at 220, 222; Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8 
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2017). 
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I. WHAT HAPPENED 
On September 6, 2013, Trent Michael Taylor was placed in a cell at the 
John Montford Unit, a psychiatric unit in a Texas prison.6 Virtually the entire 
cell—the floor, ceilings, walls, and the window—were thoroughly covered with 
human feces.7 He feared to eat inside the cell for fear of contamination, and 
feared to consume water because the faucet was also packed with feces.8 If this 
were not bad enough, Taylor was placed inside the cell completely naked.9 He 
complained about the decrepit condition of the cell, but prison officials neither 
cleaned the cell nor moved him to a different cell.10 Three of the officers 
laughed at him and said that he was “going to have a long weekend.”11 Another 
officer remarked: “[d]ude, this is [M]ontford, there is shit in all these cells from 
years of psych patients.”12 Taylor was kept inside this cell for the next four 
days, finally being removed from it on September 10, 2013.13 
The following day, on September 11, 2013, Taylor was placed inside a 
different cell.14 This cell was freezing cold because the air conditioner was 
always on;15 other prisoners dubbed the cell “the cold room.”16 One of the 
prison officials allegedly said that he hoped Taylor would “fucking freeze.”17 
Like in the first cell, he was confined in the second cell without any clothing.18 
This second cell had no bunk, no sink, and no toilet.19 The only thing the cell 
had was a drain hole in the floor, which he was expected to use when he needed 
to relieve himself.20 The drain hole smelled strongly of ammonia, making it 
hard to breathe.21 Additionally, the drain hole “was clogged with raw sewage 
that seeped onto the floor where he was forced to sleep . . . .”22 His repeated 
requests for a bathroom break were refused; and prison officials ordered him to 
urinate in the drain.23 Taylor tried to hold his urine, but eventually urinated on 
himself involuntarily.24 He was forced to remain in this cell for two days.25 At 
 
6  Taylor, 946 F.3d at 218. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Id.  
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. at 218 n.9. 
17  Id. 
18  Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 
2017). 
19  Taylor, 946 F.3d at 218. 
20  See id. at 218–19. 
21  Id. at 218. 
22  Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2. 
23  Taylor, 946 F.3d at 218–19. 
24  Id. at 219. 
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some point, the officers tried to place him back inside the first cell, but he 
refused and threatened to harm himself.26 
Taylor asserted that as a result of being subjected to those conditions, he 
experienced chest pains, burning to his eyes and throat, and severe bladder 
pain.27 He further had to be taken to the emergency room and catheterized; and 
this trip to the hospital came only after he made repeated requests for medical 
assistance on September 13, 2013, the day he was taken out of the second 
cell.28 Taylor further averred that he suffered a lasting bladder injury, and 
suffered from bladder and urinary incontinence and spasms.29 
II. THE RATIONALES OF THE TWO LOWER COURT OPINIONS 
In September 2014, Taylor filed a civil rights lawsuit against Texas prison 
officials on a host of claims.30 Among those claims were that the prison 
officials responsible for his confinement between September 6, 2013, and 
September 14, 2013, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him 
to imprisonment under those conditions.31 On January 22, 2016, a magistrate 
judge in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
recommended that the majority of Taylor’s claims be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim.32 With respect to the Eighth Amendment violation, the magistrate 
judge found those related claims to be sufficiently pled and recommended that 
the motion to dismiss be denied as to those claims.33 On March 29, 2016, a 
senior district judge fully adopted the recommendations of the magistrate 
judge, and Taylor’s Eighth Amendment claims survived the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.34 
 
25  See id. 
26  Id.; Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2. It is unclear at what point the officials tried to 
place Taylor back inside the cell. In the district court decision, officials tried to place him 
back in that cell before placing him in the second cell; in the Fifth Circuit’s decision, 
officials tried to place him back in the first cell after he spent two days in the second cell. See 
Taylor, 946 F.3d at 218; Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2. 
27  Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Complaint at 1, 17–32, Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2014). 
31  Taylor v. Williams, No. 5:14-CV-149-BG, 2016 WL 8674566, at *3–5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 
22, 2016). 
32  Id. at *6–7. 
33  Id. at *5. 
34  Taylor v. Williams, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2016 WL 1271054, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 
2016). 
26 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM [Vol. 5  
A. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas Finds 
No Eighth Amendment Violation. 
On January 5, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants on Taylor’s Eighth Amendment claims.35 The court noted that the 
defendants offered “little in the way of specific summary judgment evidence to 
support their assertion that the cells were not, in fact, covered with 
feces . . . .”36 The court further pointed out how much the defendants harped on 
Taylor allegedly being “a compulsive cleaner,”37 a claim which implies a 
recognition on their part that the cells were indeed filthy. The court also found 
no evidence that Taylor had been provided cleaning supplies,38 so it seems 
rather clear that the evidence before the court was that Taylor spent six days in 
two outrageously filthy cells. Nonetheless, the court found that the prison 
officials involved did not violate Taylor’s Eighth Amendment rights by 
subjecting him to those conditions.39  
The trial court unreasonably extrapolated from one line in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hutto v. Finney,40 improperly calling it a “holding.”41 In 
Hutto, several plaintiffs brought action alleging the conditions of their 
confinement to be unconstitutional.42 Inmates placed in punitive segregation 
had to share 8’x10’ cells with at least three other inmates, and oftentimes 
more.43 They were forced to sleep on mattresses on the floor; and, despite the 
fact that some of the inmates had contagious diseases, the mattresses were piled 
together every morning and randomly assigned every night.44 The inmates were 
inadequately fed as well, receiving less than one thousand calories a day in 
sustenance.45 Importantly, there were no limits as to how long an inmate spent 
in punitive segregation.46 All of this led the district court to find these 
conditions unconstitutional and, among other things, to impose a thirty-day 
limit on punitive segregation sentences.47 The federal appeals court affirmed 
the district court’s decision, as did the United States Supreme Court.48 
In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] filthy, overcrowded cell 
and a diet of ‘grue’ might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for 
 
35  Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8, *11 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 
2017). 
36  Id. at *7. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at *7–*8. 
40  Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
41  Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8. 
42  Hutto, 437 U.S. at 678. 
43  Id. at 682. 
44  Id. at 682–83. 
45  Id. at 683. 
46  Id. at 682. 
47  Id. at 684. 
48  Id. at 680–81. 
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weeks or months.”49 This line is not a holding, and could not be reasonably 
construed as such.50 Further, this statement must be read within the context of 
the Court’s discussion regarding punitive segregation and the specific facts of 
the case. The length of the confinement was an issue in Hutto because a) 
durations of confinement had been indeterminate;51 and b) the district court’s 
imposition of thirty-day limits was challenged, or rather, mischaracterized as a 
broader conclusion that indeterminate sentences can never be constitutional.52 
That one line in Hutto cannot reasonably be interpreted as allowing 
confinement under any circumstances, insofar as it only lasts for a few days.53 
If the conditions of confinement are extreme enough—like if a person were to 
be subject to cold temperatures at night and not provided a blanket54—there can 
be an Eighth Amendment violation, regardless of whether or not the conditions 
lasted days or weeks. Strangely enough, the Fifth Circuit seemed to recognize 
this in its decision in Palmer v. Johnson.55 
Nonetheless, the trial court in Taylor’s case construed this one line from 
Hutto to condition a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation on the duration 
of the circumstances, irrespective of how intolerable or barbaric the 
circumstances are for an inmate.56 The appellate authority on which the trial 
court chiefly relies for its conclusion,57 Davis v. Scott,58 does the same thing.59 
In Davis, the appeals court found no Eighth Amendment violation where the 
plaintiff spent three days in a cell with “blood on the walls and excretion on the 
floors and bread loaf on the floor.”60 Using Hutto, the Davis court reasoned that 
the federal constitution permitted prison officials to detain the plaintiff in the 
cell since it was “for only three days.”61 The Davis court further explained that 
the plaintiff was given cleaning supplies when he complained about the 
conditions, thereby “mitigating any intolerable conditions.”62 The trial court 
applied Davis to the facts here even though the length of confinement was 
twice as long and even though Taylor, unlike the plaintiff in Davis, was not 
provided cleaning supplies.63 
 
49  Id. at 686–87. 
50  See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 55–56 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring). 
51  Hutto, 437 U.S. at 682. 
52  Id. at 685. 
53  See Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 56 (Alito, J., concurring). 
54  Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). 
55  See Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352–54 (5th Cir. 1999). 
56  See Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 
2017). 
57  Id. 
58  Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003 (5th Cir. 1998). 
59  See id. at 1006. 
60  Id. at 1004, 1006. 
61  See id. at 1006. 
62  Id. (citations omitted). 
63  See Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *7–*8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 
5, 2017). 
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To the district court, the federal constitution permitted a human being to be 
imprisoned first in a feces-filled cell, and then in a second cell in frigid 
temperature with no bunk, no toilet, no sink, and a hole in the floor—smelling 
of ammonia and overflowing with raw sewage—because the total confinement 
“only” lasted for six days.64 
B. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Finds an Eighth Amendment Violation, 
but Also Finds that Prison Officials Did Not Have “Fair Warning” that 
Their Behavior Was Unconstitutional. 
On December 20, 2019, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s ruling on those specific claims, albeit on slightly different 
grounds.65 The appeals court still found that summary judgment was 
appropriate, but not because there was no constitutional violation.66 Indeed, the 
appellate court found that Taylor’s Eighth Amendment rights were infringed 
upon.67 The court correctly noted that the length of time was a non-dispositive 
factor to be considered.68 The court further found that Davis was inapplicable, 
both due to the longer length of time in Taylor’s case and the fact that prison 
officials did not provide Taylor with cleaning supplies, unlike the plaintiff in 
Davis.69 The court noted how “obvious” the danger of Taylor being exposed to 
bodily waste was, especially given that he was made to sleep on a urine-soaked 
floor without any clothing.70  
Yet, as “obvious” as the risks were, the appellate court granted qualified 
immunity on the ground that the prison officials “weren’t on ‘fair warning’ that 
their specific acts were unconstitutional.”71 This bears repeating: the court 
found that the prison officials might not have known that confining Taylor in a 
cell filled from floor to ceiling with human feces for four days, and then in an 
extremely cold cell with no sink, toilet, or bunk for two days—where he had to 
sleep completely naked on a urine-soaked floor—would violate the 
constitution.72 In arriving at this preposterous decision, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals played on that same line from Hutto, finding that the dicta in the 
Supreme Court’s decision created “ambiguity” with respect to what constituted 
impermissible confinement conditions.73 The appellate court also cited to its 
decision in McCord v. Maggio,74 which dealt with a ten-month period of 
 
64  See id. at *2, *8. 
65  Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2019). 
66  See id. at 218. 
67  Id. at 222. 
68  Id. at 220 (citing Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
69  Id. at 221. 
70  See id. at 222. 
71  Id. 
72  See id. 
73  See id. 
74  McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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confinement.75 So once again, the granting of qualified immunity for these 
defendants in Taylor’s case turned not on the nature of the conditions, but on 
the fact that the conditions “only” lasted for six days.76 
Even before the Supreme Court’s intervention in this case, there were clear 
indications that the Fifth Circuit’s decision did not square with the high court’s 
jurisprudence. For example, the Court opined in Wilson v. Seiter that exposing 
an inmate to cold temperatures without providing sufficient means to stay 
warm would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.77 That clearly 
happened in Taylor’s case, at least with respect to his confinement in the 
second prison cell—it was freezing cold, and Taylor did not even have clothes 
on.78 Beyond that, the Supreme Court has indicated that qualified immunity is 
inappropriate where the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent.79 It is difficult 
to imagine a scenario where the illegality is less apparent, given how the Fifth 
Circuit found that prison officials engaged in misconduct and disregarded the 
“obvious” risks of that misconduct. 
Aside from that, common sense seems to have evaded both lower courts. It 
goes without saying that humans should not be unnecessarily exposed to human 
feces. Prolonged or unnecessary exposure to human waste is not merely 
“uncomfortable” as the trial court posited.80 The World Health Organization 
noted how human waste has been linked to the transmission of a wide array of 
infectious diseases.81 Scholarly articles have been written advocating for proper 
waste disposal systems, because a lack of such systems can have disastrous 
health effects.82 Other appellate courts have also recognized that exposure to 
human waste heightens Eighth Amendment concerns.83 But even on a more 
basic level, it is common knowledge that human beings should not defecate 
anywhere and wallow in feces. People generally know to go to designated 
places when they need to relieve themselves; they are called bathrooms. It is 
further common knowledge that defecating anywhere would not only make 
places unsanitary, but also unhealthy. Being in a small environment that is 
 
75  Taylor, 946 F.3d at 219, 222. 
76  See id. at 222. 
77  Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). 
78  Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020). 
79  E.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
80  See Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 
2017). 
81  Richard Carr, Excreta-Related Infections and the Role of Sanitation in the Control of 
Transmission, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 90 (2001), 
https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/iwachap5.pdf. 
82  See, e.g., C. Rose et al., The Characterization of Feces and Urine: A Review of the 
Literature to Inform Advanced Treatment Technology, 45 CRITICAL REVIEWS ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. 1827, 1828 (May 29, 2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4500995/. 
83  See, e.g., McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir. 2001); Fruit v. Norris, 905 
F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989); 
LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972) 
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covered with “massive amounts of feces” is beyond unusual; forcing a human 
being to remain in that environment, even for a day, is beyond cruel. 
It is further clear that both lower courts have lost sight of not just Taylor’s 
humanity, but the humanity of inmates generally. It is not as if the two cells 
Taylor was housed in were the only two cells available for placement during 
those six days.84 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit provided “no evidence that the 
conditions of Taylor’s confinement were compelled by necessity or 
exigency.”85 Nor did the Fifth Circuit explain why the nature of Taylor’s 
imprisonment “could not have been mitigated, either in degree or duration.”86 
In fact, the Fifth Circuit’s factual record suggests that not only was the 
confinement unnecessary, but it was also sadistic.87 The officials laughed at 
Taylor while he was in the first cell, declaring that he would have “a long 
weekend” in a cell they knew to be filled with feces.88 They must have known 
that he was not eating during those first four days, given that Taylor declined to 
eat for fear of contamination.89 One official allegedly hoped he would freeze in 
the second cell, dubbed “the cold room” by other inmates.90 The officials told 
him to urinate in a drain hole that smelled of ammonia and overflowed with 
raw sewage; and they refused to escort him to the bathroom for a twenty-four 
hour period.91 How either the district court could rule that this was not 
unconstitutional, or the appellate court could find the unconstitutionality of this 
conduct to not be “beyond debate,” utterly boggles the mind.  
It is further baffling how the Fifth Circuit arrived at its conclusion in light 
of its decision in Palmer v. Johnson.92 In Palmer, the appellate court found a 
clear Eighth Amendment violation where an inmate was confined to a six-
hundred-square-foot area with forty-nine other inmates for a period of 
seventeen hours.93 The Palmer court specifically found barbaric a) the fact that 
the plaintiff was told he had to urinate or defecate within the confined space;94 
and b) that Palmer was denied sufficient means of keeping warm and was 
forced to endure cold temperatures.95 While there are distinctions between 
Palmer and the instant matter, it is difficult to see how the concerns the Fifth 
Circuit had in Palmer do not apply here. Like the plaintiff in Palmer, Taylor 
was without a toilet in the second cell, and for a longer period than the plaintiff 
in Palmer.96 Also like the plaintiff in Palmer, Taylor was subjected to frigid 
 
84  See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  See Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2019). 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 218 n.9. 
91  Id. at 218–19. 
92  See Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 354 (5th Cir. 1999). 
93  Id. at 349, 353–54. 
94  Id. at 352. 
95  Id. at 352–53. 
96  See Taylor, 946 F.3d at 223–25. 
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temperatures in the second cell; and unlike the plaintiff in Palmer, Taylor did 
not even have clothing on.97 If the plaintiff in Palmer had “clearly established 
rights under the Eighth Amendment,”98 then so too did Taylor. The Fifth 
Circuit should have followed Palmer in this case. 
III. AN UNLIKELY INTERVENTION 
It is quite disturbing to think that if the Supreme Court of the United States 
had not granted certiorari—and at least one justice was of the opinion that 
certiorari should not have been granted99—a flagrant violation of the Eighth 
Amendment would have been sanctioned and the purveyors of that violation 
absolved of any liability. Thankfully, however, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in this case; and on November 2, 2020, the Court reversed the 
decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.100 The high court referred to the 
facts of the case as “particularly egregious” and found that “no reasonable 
correctional officer could have concluded that, under the extreme 
circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor 
in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of 
time.”101 Seven justices joined in the majority, with one of the seven justices 
issuing a concurrence.102 One justice dissented without an opinion, and the last 
justice took no part in the consideration of the case.103 
This decision should not be taken lightly. Over the past few years, the 
Supreme Court has been roundly criticized as a racist, classist, and politically 
conservative court.104 Further, the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity 
doctrine and jurisprudence has contributed to a disturbing pattern of state actors 
 
97  See id. at 218–20. 
98  Palmer, 193 F.3d at 353. 
99  See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54–56 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring). 
100  Id. at 53–54. 
101  Id. 
102  See id. at 52–56. 
103  See id. at 54. 
104  See, e.g., Sabeel Rahman, The US Supreme Court Has Become a Threat to Democracy. 
Here's How We Fix It, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2020, 8:19 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/24/supreme-court-threat-to-
democracy-rbg-how-we-fix-it; Neil S. Siegel, The Supreme Court Is Avoiding Talking About 
Race, ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/supreme-court-doesnt-like-talk-about-
race/614944/; Dahlia Lithwick, Former Judge Resigns from the Supreme Court Bar, SLATE 
(Mar. 13, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/judge-james-
dannenberg-supreme-court-bar-roberts-letter.amp; Dahlia Lithwick, How the Roberts Court 
Abandoned Bipartisan Consensus, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2019, 11:14 AM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/11/john-roberts-court-abandoned-bipartisan-
consensus-dark-money-republican-donors.html; IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: 
HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 
84–86, 104 (2014); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 108–09 (2010). 
32 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM [Vol. 5  
being absolved of liability for serious misconduct.105 In light of this, that this 
Supreme Court found the circumstances in this case “particularly egregious” 
says a lot about how obviously inhumane the circumstances truly were for 
Taylor. It also speaks volumes about the two lower courts that viewed the same 
facts and found no actionable constitutional violation. 
The concurring justice, Samuel Alito, opposed the granting of review in 
this case and wrote that the decision “adds virtually nothing to the law going 
forward.”106 Ideally, this may not necessarily be true. Aside from serving as a 
much-needed rebuke of the Fifth Circuit, this decision sets at least some bounds 
on what conduct clearly constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation within the 
cell confinement context. This decision also provides some clarity on the line 
from Hutto that the Fifth Circuit used to validate inexcusable conduct. This 
same line has been invoked by other federal circuit courts as a rule of sorts.107 
Perhaps the Supreme Court’s clarity can positively influence future decisions in 
this area of law. 
Additionally, the Court’s decision may influence the Fifth Circuit to revisit 
its jurisprudence in this area and, most importantly, to rethink its decision in 
Davis v. Scott. There is no reason why it should be impermissible for a human 
being to be confined under plainly unsanitary conditions for six days, but 
somehow acceptable if it were only for three days. That the plaintiff in Davis 
was given cleaning supplies did not seem to make the difference; it is apparent 
from the decision that the federal appeals court would have found no violation 
regardless of whether or not the plaintiff had been given cleaning supplies.108 
The Fifth Circuit should reconsider what precedential value Davis should have 
going forward. 
Finally, the Court’s decision should remind everyone that convicts, 
detainees, and inmates are nonetheless human beings and should be treated as 
such. It should put officials at prisons and jails throughout America on notice 
that there are limits to their authority and consequences for abuse and sadism. 
The Court’s decision should make lower courts throughout the nation 
remember the values they profess to stand by and consider what kind of society 
America would be to allow its citizens to be caged under conditions as plainly 
 
105  See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz, How the Supreme Court Enables Police Excessive Force, 
N.Y. L. J. (June 5, 2020, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/06/05/how-the-supreme-court-enables-
police-excessive-force/; Andrew Chung et al., For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court 
Protection, REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/. 
106  Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 55 (Alito, J., concurring). 
107  See, e.g., Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1311–12 (10th Cir. 1998). 
108  See Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998). The court relies on the one line 
in Hutto and then concludes that the plaintiff was only in the cell for three days, and then 
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horrific as they were here. Barbarities like what happened to Taylor cannot 
stand if the Eighth Amendment is to have any meaning. 
CONCLUSION 
Trent Michael Taylor allegedly spent six days in two prison cells under 
utterly abominable conditions.109 In the first cell, the floor, ceiling, walls, and 
the faucet were caked with human feces.110 The second cell was freezing cold, 
had no bunk, toilet, or sink, and contained only a drain hole in the floor that 
smelled of ammonia and overflowed with raw sewage.111 In both cells, Taylor 
was deprived of clothing and was completely naked.112 He went without food 
during the entire time in the first cell for fear of contamination; and he held his 
urine, for fear of overflowing an already clogged drain, before involuntarily 
urinating on himself in the second cell.113 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit remanded 
Taylor’s case to the district court.114 Whether or not Taylor will ultimately 
prevail at trial will depend on whether he can establish the aforementioned 
facts. Regardless of that, it is clear that qualified immunity should not have 
been granted. The Fifth Circuit should have concluded that, assuming his 
accusations to be true, Taylor had clearly established Eighth Amendment rights 
that were violated. It should not have taken seven years and a Supreme Court 
intervention for a judicial opinion memorializing this rather obvious 
conclusion. 
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